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S E C R E T SECTION 1 OF 6 USNATO 0390

E.O. 11652: GDS

TAGS: OVIP (MONDALE, WALTER F.), NATO, PFOR

SUBJ: VICE PRESIDENT MONDALE'S MEETING WITH THE NORTH ATLANTIC
COUNCIL, JANUARY 24

SUMMARY: MEMBERS OF THE COUNCIL WARMLY WELCOMED THE VICE
PRESIDENT'S VISIT TO NATO AND THE STRONG AFFIRMATION IN HIS
OPENING STATEMENT OF THE US COMMITMENT TO EUROPE, US RESOLVE
TO MAINTAIN ITS MILITARY STRENGTH AND FORCES IN EUROPE, AND
THE DETERMINATION OF THE NEW ADMINISTRATION TO CONSULT FULLY
WITH THE ALLIES ON SALT, CSCE, MBFR, AND DEFENSE ISSUES.
(THE VICE PRESIDENT'S STATEMENT TRANSMITTED SEPTTEL). ALLIED
REPS ESPECIALLY PAULS (FRG), COMMENTED ON THE NEED
FOR A SOBER AND OBJECTIVE APPRECIATION OF SOVIET MILITARY POWER,
THE NEED NOT TO OVERDRAMATIZE THE THREAT, AND THE NEED TO MAIN-
TAIN STRONG ALLIED DEFENSE AND COHESION WHILE PURSUING DETENTE
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WITH THE EAST. BUSCH (NORWAY) DESCRIBED HIS AUTHORITY'S
DESIRE TO MAINTAIN SECURITY WHILE DEVELOPING NEIGHBORLY RELATIONS
WITH THE USSR. TINE (FRANCE) STRESSED THE IMPLICATIONS OF RECENT
DEVELOPMENTS IN EASTERN EUROPE AS A FOCUS FOR EARLY ALLIED
CONSULTATIONS. IN RESPONSE, THE VICE
PRESIDENT WELCOMED THE OPPORTUNITY TO LISTEN TO ALLIED VIEWS
AND SAID THAT THE NEW ADMINISTRATION WOULD CONSULT ON KEY
ISSUES AND THAT US ACTIONS WOULD NOT CATCH THE ALLIES BY SURPRISE.
LUNS EXPRESSED APPRECIATION FOR THE VICE PRESIDENT'S PRESENTATION
AND STRESSED THE USEFULNESS OF HIS MEETING WITH THE COUNCIL.

COMMENTS FROM MANY PERMREPS AND OTHER MEMBERS OF DELEGATIONS
FOLLOWING THE MEETING REFLECTED HIGH ESTEEM FOR THE VICE PRES-
IDENT'S PRESENTATION AND THE EXTREMELY FAVORABLE IMPRESSION
HIS VISIT MADE ON MEMBERS OF THE COUNCIL.
END SUMMARY.

1. IN OPENING THE MEETING, LUNS WARMLY WELCOMED THE VICE
PRESIDENT, CONGRATULATED HIM ON HIS ELECTION AND SAID THE COUNCIL
WAS LOOKING FORWARD TO HEARING HIS VIEWS AND WOULD ALSO APPRECIATE
AN OPPORTUNITY TO ASK QUESTIONS. THE VICE PRESIDENT PRESENTED
HIS STATEMENT, WHICH WAS SUBSEQUENTLY RELEASED TO THE PRESS. LUNS
WELCOMED THE POSITIVE, AND STIRRING MESSAGE FROM THE NEW
ADMINISTRATION, WHICH HE WAS SURE WAS RECEIVED WITH GRATITUDE
AND A SENSE OF CONFIDENCE BY ALL ALLIES.

2. CATALANO (ITALY), THE DEAN OF THE COUNCIL, EXPRESSED DEEP
GRATITUDE FOR THE VICE PRESIDENT'S REMARKS. HE PARTICULARLY
WELCOMED THE REASSURANCE OF THE US COMMITMENT TO THE ALLIANCE
AND TO FULL CONSULTATIONS. NOTING THE CENTRAL IMPORTANCE
OF THE DIALOGUE AMONG ALLIES, CATALANO REFERRED TO LIMITED
"MISUNDERSTANDINGS" IN THE PAST. THESE MISUNDERSTANDINGS RESULTED
FROM DIFFICULTY ON THE PART OF SOME ALLIES IN "APPRECIATING
ALL THE REASONS UNDERLYING US ACTIONS" IN TIMES OF ACUTE CRISIS,
WHICH CREATED DIFFICULTY FOR ALLIES IN ACHIEVING THE FULL SUPPORT
AND PUBLIC BACKING FOR US ACTIONS THAT WOULD HAVE BEEN DESIRABLE.
LEAVING ASIDE THESE FEW INSTANCES, HOWEVER, THE CONSULTATIVE PROCESS
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AMONG ALLIES HAD WORKED WELL AND, CATALANO WAS CONFIDENT,
WOULD CONTINUE TO BE EFFECTIVE IN MEETING THE CHALLENGES
AHEAD. THE PROCESS OF DETENTE WAS AN IMPORTANT CHALLENGE,
CATALANO SAID, SINCE THERE WAS NO ALTERNATIVE TO PURSUING BETTER
RELATIONS WITH THE EAST THROUGH DISCUSSION OF CONCRETE ISSUES.
HOWEVER, GROWING SOVIET STRENGTH REQUIRED THE WEST TO INCREASE
ITS STRENGTH AT A TIME OF
SEVERE ECONOMIC PROBLEMS. IN THIS REGARD ALLIANCE CONSULTATIONS
WERE MOST IMPORTANT. CATALANO WELCOMED THE VALUABLE PAPERS
AND IDEAS CONTRIBUTED BY THE US IN PREPARATION FOR THE BELGRADE
CSCE MEETING AND LOOKED FORWARD TO FURTHER EFFECTIVE CONSUL-
TATIONS LEADING UP TO THE MEETING. HE WELCOMED, AS WELL, THE
VICE PRESIDENT'S REFERENCE TO RENEWED US EFFORTS IN RESOLVING
PROBLEMS IN THE MIDDLE EAST AND SOUTHERN AFRICA. IN THE
DISARMAMENT FIELD HE BELIEVED THE WEST SHOULD BE MORE ACTIVE
IN PUTTING FORWARD SPECIFIC PROPOSALS TO IMPROVE THE PUBLIC
IMAGE OF NATO AND TO AVOID A SITUATION WHERE THE WEST APPEARED
MERELY TO REACT TO NUMEROUS SOVIET PROPOSALS ON DISARMAMENT.
ON SALT, CATALANO THANKED THE US FOR ITS THOROUGH CONSUL-
TATIONS WITH THE ALLIES AND THE INFORMATION THE US HAD CONSIS-
TENTLY PROVIDED. HE LOOKED FORWARD TO CONTINUING CLOSE
CONSULTATIONS

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ON SALT, PARTICULARLY IN LIGHT OF EUROPEAN CONCERNS REGARDING TREATMENT OF NON-TRANSFER, NON-CIRCUMVENTION AND FORWARD-BASED SYSTEMS. ON MBFR, THE DIRECT PARTICIPANTS MUST STAND FIRM CATALANO SAID, IN MAINTAINING THE OBJECTIVES OF A COMMON COLLECTIVE CEILING, REDUCTIONS IN TWO PHASES, AND REDUCED DISPARITIES IN MILITARY FORCES IN CENTRAL EUROPE. ANY CHANGE IN THIS BASIC APPROACH, HE BELIEVED, WOULD PRODUCE UNCERTAINTY.

3. PAULS (FRG) IN A LENGTHY STATEMENT, FOUND THE VICE PRESIDENT'S STATEMENT MOST ENCOURAGING, PARTICULARLY IN ITS PLEDGE OF FULL US COMMITMENT TO THE ALLIANCE AND THE MAINTENANCE AND REINFORCEMENT OF US STRENGTH IN EUROPE. HE LOOKED FORWARD TO INTENSIVE CONSULTATIONS WITH THE US ON ISSUES OF COMMON INTEREST TO THE ALLIES. AN IMMEDIATE CONCERN, PAULS BELIEVED, WAS THE CONTINUING ARMS RACE, INITIATED BY THE USSR, AND THE DEVELOPMENT
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OF SOVIET SEA POWER, PARTICULARLY ON NATO'S FLANKS. IN THE EASTERN MEDITERRANEAN, THE DEVELOPMENT OF SOVIET SEA POWER WAS EVIDENT OVER THE PAST SEVEN YEARS, AND THE SITUATION WAS FURTHER COMPLICATED BY THE MIDDLE EAST SITUATION AND A CONFLICT BETWEEN TWO OF OUR MOST IMPORTANT ALLIES OVER CYPRUS AND THE AEGEAN. PAULS HOPED THAT THESE ALLIES WOULD FIND A SOLUTION TO THEIR PROBLEMS THROUGH COMMON SENSE AND THAT THE NEW ADMINISTRATION, FULLY BACKED BY CONGRESS, WOULD ALSO BE ABLE TO PLAY A ROLE IN RESOLVING THIS CONFLICT BECAUSE OF ITS KEY IMPORTANCE TO ALLIANCE SECURITY. NOTING THAT THE QUESTION OF SPANISH ADMI-

SSIONTO NATO HAD BEEN DEBATED IN RECENT MONTHS, PAULS EXPRESSED THE VIEW THAT SPANISH ACCESSION TO NATO WOULD BE WELCOMED BY THE ALLIES. AT THE SAME TIME, HE THOUGHT IT IMPORTANT TO LEAVE IT TO SPAIN TO MAKE ITS OWN DECISION ON THIS ISSUE. IT WOULD BE A MISTAKE FOR OTHERS TO URGE ANY COUNTRY TO ENTER NATO SINCE SUCH EFFORTS COULD HAVE A NEGATIVE INFLUENCE ON THE COUNTRY CONCERNED. TURNING TO THE NORTHERN FLANK, PAULS COMMENTED ON THE INCREASE IN THE STRENGTH OF THE SOVIET FLEET OPERATING OUT OF MURMANSK, ELEMENTS OF TENSION IN THE BARENTS SEA, AND THE CRUCIAL ROLE OF ICELAND IN ALLINACE DEFENSE. HE BELIEVED AS WELL THAT THE AZORES WOULD PLAY A GROWING ROLE.

4. REFERRING TO THE VICE PRESIDENT'S COMMENTS ON SOUTH AFRICA, PAULS EXPRESSED THE VIEW THAT THREATS OUTSIDE THE TREATY AREA WOULD BECOME INCREASINGLY RELEVANT TO ALLIANCE DEFENSE IN THE FUTURE. THE THREAT WAS NOT ONE OF OPEN CONFLICT OR WAR, BUT RATHER A THREAT TO ECONOMIC LIFELINES TO RAW MATERIALS AND TO OIL. COMMENTING ON AN INCREASED THREAT TO THE BALTIC APPROACHES, PAULS NOTED THAT IN THE CENTRAL REGION ALLIED COUNTRIES WERE ACCUSTOMED TO THINKING ABOUT THE THREAT FROM THE EAST, BUT MUST NOW ALSO CONSIDER THE THREAT TO THE BALIC FROM SOVIET FORCES THROUGH THE NORWEGIAN SEA AND NORTH SEA. THE JOINT ALLIED MANEUVERS WITH THE US IN THE NORTHERN REGION LAST YEAR EVIDENCED ALLIED RECOGNITION OF THIS THREAT.

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5. PAULS SAID HE UNDERSTOOD THE GOOD INTENTIONS OF SELF-APPOINTED EXPERTS, BOTH POLITICAL AND MILITARY, IN THEIR COMMENTS ON THE LIKELY RESULTS OF A POSSIBLE SURPRISE ATTACK BY THE SOVIETS THROUGH CENTRAL EUROPE. COMMENTS THAT THE SOVIETS COULD REACH THE RHINE AND BONN WITHIN 48 HOURS WERE DESIGNED, OF COURSE, TO STIMULATE ALLIED DEFENSE EFFORTS, PARTICULARLY IN THE CONVENTIONAL FIELD. HOWEVER, SUCH STATEMENTS ALSO TENDED TO DISCOURAGE ALLIES AND TO INDUCE A SPIRIT OF RESIGNATION. IT WAS IMPORTANT, THEREFORE, TO REFLECT IN A MOST SOBER MANNER ON SOVIET CAPABILITIES AND TO MAKE BALANCED ESTIMATES OF THE REAL POSSIBILITIES. PAULS SAID THAT STATEMENTS BY SOME GDR OFFICIALS INDICATING THAT THEY CONSIDER WAR AS A CONTINUATION OF POLICY AND THE RECENT DEBATE ON SOVIET CIVIL DEFENSE EFFORTS SHOULD INDEED GIVE THE ALLIES A BASIS FOR SOBER REFLECTION. BUT THE POSSIBLIITY OF DIRECT ATTACK FROM THE EAST SHOULD NOT BE OVER-DRAMATIZED. WHILE THE POSSIBILITY OF SURPORISE ATTACK COULD NOT BE ENTIRELY EXCLUDED, IT WAS UNLIKELY. THE MORE IMMEDIATE PROSPECT WAS FOR SOVIET POLITICAL PRESSURE ENHANCED BY SOVIET MILITARY POWER, AND THIS THREAT SEEMED MORE EVIDENT ON THE FLANKS THAN IN THE CENTRAL REGION.

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6. NOTING SOME UNCERTAINTY ABOUT WHAT WILL DEVELOP FROM CURRENT UNREST IN EASTERN EUROPE, PAULS SAID THAT, DESPITE THEIR UNPOPULARITY, EUROPEAN COMMUNIST REGIMES ARE STRONG AND MAINTAIN THEIR POSITION BY FORCE. THE AGING LEADERSHIP IN THE USSR MIGHT SOON LEAVE THE WEST TO FACE NEW SOVIET LEADERS WHO, THOUGH WEAKER IN THE INITIAL PHASES OF THEIR ACCESSION TO POWER, MIGHT, DURING THIS PERIOD OF WEAKNESS, BE INCLINED TOWARD GREATER ADVENTURISM.

7. STRESSING THE ESSENTIALITY OF JOINT EFFORTS AND COHESION AMONG THE ALLIES IN LIGHT OF THE DEVELOPMENTS HE HAD DESCRIBED, PAULS EXPRESSED THE VIEW THAT THE POLICY OF SEEKING A MODUS VIVENDI WITH THE EAST WAS THREATENED AT PRESENT. THE WAY FOR THE ALLIES TO PREVAIL WAS THUS THROUGH ADEQUATE STRENGTH AND SOLIDARITY SINCE EVIDENCE OF WEAKNESS BY THE WEST WOULD BE MOST DANGEROUS. REFERRING TO A STATEMENT BY
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SECRETARY VANCE THAT THE UNITED STATES WOULD SEEK ACTIVELY AND AGGRESSIVELY TO REDUCE TENSIONS WITH THE USSR, PAULS EXPRESSED THE HOPE THAT THIS EFFORT WOULD BE PURSUED THROUGH CLOSE CONSULTATIONS WITH THE ALLIES RATHER THAN THROUGH US-SOVIET BILATERALISM WHICH COULD WEAKEN THE ALLIANCE. IN THIS REGARD, HE PARTICULARLY WELCOMED THE COMMITMENT OF THE US PRESIDENT AND VICE-PRESIDENT TO INTENSIVE CONSULTATIONS WITH THE NATO ALLIES ON PREPARATIONS FOR BELGRADE, ON NBFR, AND ON SALT II. RECALLING DANISH SUGGESTIONS FOR INCREASED WESTERN ACTIVITY THE DISARMAMENT FIELD, HE EXPRESSED THE VIEW THERE WOULD BE NO HEADWAY IN MBFR WITHOUT PROGRESS IN SALT II, AND, THEREFORE,

HE WISHED THE NEW ADMINISTRATION WELL IN ITS SALT EFFORTS.

8. IN RECENT WEEKS, PAULS SAID, THE ALLIES HAD NOT BEEN ABLE TO FIND A WAY TO ACHIEVE THEIR OBJECTIVE OF ADDITIONAL FUNDING FOR NATO'S INFRASTRUCTUR PROGRAM. HE HOPED, HOWEVER, THAT THIS OBJECTIVE WOULD BE ACHIEVED IN THE NEAR FUTURE SINCE IT PROVIDED AN EXAMPLE OF THE TYPE OF COOPERATIOON IN JOINTLY INCREASED ALLIED DEFENSE EFFORTS TO WHICH THE VICE PRESIDENT REFERRED. MOREOVER, HE WONDERED HOW MORE DIFFICULT DECISIONS LIKE THOSE ON AWACS COULD BE MADE IF INFRASTRUCTURE DECISIONS COULD NOT BE TAKEN. DEFENSE CUTS WERE POPULAR AT PRESENT, HE NOTED, BECAUSE OF THE EXIGENCIES OF THE ECONOMIC SITUATION. BUT THE ALLIES MUST ALL FIGHT AGAINST THE TEMPTATION TO TAKE DECISIONS SIMPLY BECAUSE OF THEIR POPULARITY. IN THE ECONOMIC AREA, THE ALLIES HAVE DRIFTED APART; NOTHING WAS MORE IMPORTANT THAN TO DEMONSTRATE THE IDENTITY OF INTERESTS IN THIS SPHERE.

9. TURNING TO EUROPEAN PROBLEMS, PAULS RECALLED THAT IN 1972 THE EC GOVERNMENTS HAD DECIDED TO TRY TO ACHIEVE EUROPEAN UNION BY 1980. NOW, IN 1977, IT WAS EVIDENT THAT EUROPE WAS STILL FAR AWAY FROM THIS GOAL, PERHAPS EVEN FURTHER THAN IT HAD BEEN FIVE YEARS AGO. NEVERTHELESS, ALL EUROPEAN STATES-MEN AND THE EUROPEAN PUBLIC REALIZE THAT EUROPEAN UNITY IS THE MOST EFFECTIVE WAY TO STRENGTHEN EUROPE'S POWER AND TO INCREASE EUROPE'S ABILITY TO HAVE AN IMPACT ON OTHER AREAS.

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EUROPEANS RECALLED HOW HELPFUL US POLICY, GOING BACK TO THE 50'S, HAD BEEN IN PROMOTING A UNITED EURIPE, AND THEY HOPED THA NOW AGAIN THE UNITED STATES WOULD CONTRIBUTE TO THE CONSTRUCTIO OF EUROPE. THIS EFFORT, HE SAID, WOULD BE THE GREATEST CONTRIBUTION THE UNITED STATES COULD MAKE TO STRENGTHENING ITS EUROPEAN PARTNERS.

10. HARTOGH (NETHERLANDS) EXPRESSED THE DEEP APPRECIATION OF HIS AUTHORITIES FOR THE VICE PRESIDENT'S VISIT TO BRUSSELS AND HIS MEETING WITH THE COUNCIL. THE COMMITMENT OF THE NEW ADMINISTRATION TO NATO WAS MADE EVIDENT IN THE PRESIDENT'S MESSAGE TO THE NAC MINISTERIAL IN DECEMBER AND WAS BORNE OUT BY THE VICE PRESIDENT'S STATEMENT TODAY. NOTING THE IMPORTANCE THE VICE PRESIDENT ATTACHED TO THE CLOSEST POSSIBLE COOPERATION AMONG WESTERN COUNTRIES, HARTOGH BELIEVED SUCH COOPERATION WAS ESSENTIAL TO EFFECTIVE DEVELOPMENT OF ALLIED RELATIONS WITH EASTERN EUROPE. INDEED, THE EFFECTIVENESS OF CLOSE ALLIED CONSULTATIONS WAS DEMONSTRATED IN THE RESULTS OF THE HELSINKI CONFERENCE, THE EFFECT OF WHICH HAD BEEN TERMED A TRIUMPH OF STATESMANSHIP BY THE US CONGRESSIONAL CSCE COMMISSION. HARTOGH LOOKED FORWARD TO EXPANDED ALLIED COOPERATION IN PREPARATION FOR BELGRADE AND FOR A USEFUL INTERPLAY BETWEEN THE NINE AND NATO IN

THIS ENDEAVOR. THE ABSENCE OF PROGRESS IN MBFR,
HARTOGH SAID, WAS NOT THE FAULT OF THE WEST WHICH
SHOULD PURSUE THESE NEGOTIATIONS WITH DILIGENCE

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AND PATIENC IN THE HOPE THAT THEY WOULD EVENTUALLY
LEAD TOWARD PROGRESS IN REDUCING CONFRONTATION IN
CENTRAL EUROPE. COMMENTING ON THE IMPORTANCE OF
SALT, HARTOGH WELCOMED THE WILLINGNESS OF THE NEW
ADMINISTRATION TO CONSULT BEFORE TAKING NEW MOVES
IN THIS AREA. REFERRING TO THE IMPRESSION THAT A STRATEGIC
ARMS RACE COULD CONTINUE WITHIN THE LIMITATIONS FORESEEN
BY THE EXISTING AGREEMENTS ON SALT, HARTOGH ASKED HOW THE
NEW ADMINISTRATION ENVISAGED SHAPING THESE NEGOTIATIONS TO
REACH THE OBJECTIVE OF REDUCTIONS IN NUCLEAR WEAPONS
SIGNALLED BY THE PRESIDENT IN HIS INAUGURAL SPEECH. IN CONCL-
UDING, HARROGH SAID THE NETHERLANDS RECOGNIZES THE NEED TO MAINTAIN
AN EQUILIBRIUM OF POWER IN EUROPE. THE NETHERLANDS WOULD
BE PREPARED TO DO ITS PART AND, OF COURSE, WELCOMED INCREASED
CONTRIBUTIONS BY THE UNITED STATES AS EXIMPLIFIED BY THE NORTHAG
BRIGADE. REFERRING TO RECENT ESTIMATES IN THE US OF
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INCREASED SOVIET MILITARY STRENGTH, HARTOGH ALSO WELCOMED THE
STEPS TAKEN BY THE US ADMINISTRATION IN 1976 TO HALT THE DECLINE
IN US DEFENSE SPENDING IN REAL TERMS AND TO POINT TOWARD
GROWTH IN US DEFENSE EFFORTS IN THE FUTURE.

11. BUSCH (NORWAY) EXPRESSED SPECIAL APPRECIATION FOR THE VICE PRESIDENT'S MEETING WITH THE COUNCIL, PARTICULARLY IN VIEW OF THE VICE PRESIDENT'S FAMILY TIES TO NORWAY. THE VICE PRESIDENT INTERJECTED IN A LIGHT VEIN, THAT HE BELIEVED THAT AS A SENATOR FROM MINNESOTA HE MAY HAVE REPRESENTED MORE NORWEGIANS THAN THE NORWEGIAN AMBASSADOR. BUSCH CONTINUED THAT HIS AUTHORITIES ATTACHED THE GREATEST IMPORTANCE TO THE COMMITMENT BY US AND CANADA TO THE DEFENSE OF EUROPE. THIS COMMITMENT WAS PARTICULARLY ESSENTIAL TODAY AT A TIME OF UNCERTAINTY IN EAST-WEST RELATIONS, WHEN DETENTE COULD ONLY BE PURSUED THROUGH THE CLOSEST COOPERATION AMONG THE ALLIES. COMMENTING ON THE GROWING MILITARY AND ECONOMIC IMPORTANCE OF THE NORTHERN REGION, BUSCH SAID THE SOVIET BUILD-UP ON THE KOLA PENINSULA AND OFFSHORE BRUGHT HOME TO NORWEGIANS THE EXPOSED SECURITY ENVIRONMENT IN WHICH THEY LIVED. THE OBJECTIVE OF HIS COUNTRY IN THIS SITUATION, BUSCH SAID, WAS TO STRIKE A BALANCE BETWEEN THE NEED TO MAINTAIN THE STRENGTH OF THE NATO ALLIANCE AND THE NEED TO PURSUE NEIGHBORLY RELATIONS WITH THE USSR. NORWAY FACED DIFFICULT PROBLEMS AT PRESENT ON THE QUESTION OF DEMARCATION OF THE LINE BETWEEN NORWAY AND THE USSR IN THE BARENTS SEA AND ALSO ON THE QUESTION OF SPITZBERGEN. IT WOULD TAKE TIME TO SOLVE THESE PROBLEMS, HE SAID, AND NORWAY WOULD NEED THE SUPPORT OF ITS ALLIES IN MAINTAINING SECURITY TOGETHER WITH A LOW LEVEL OF TENSION IN THE NORTHERN REGION.

12. SVART (DENMARK) SAID HIS AUTHORITIES ATTACH THE GREATEST IMPORTANCE TO PURSUING RELATIONS WITH THE EAST THROUGH CONSULTATIONS WITHIN THE ALLIANCE AND WOULD THEREFORE WELCOME THE VICE PRESIDENT'S REMARKS. THE TWIN CONCEPTS OF DETENTE AND DEFENSE WERE THE BASIS
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OF ALLIED POLICIES, SVART SAID, AND HE APPRECIATED THE VICE PRESIDENT'S REMARKS THAT ATTENTION WOULD BE PAID TO THE INTERESTS OF EACH MEMBER STATE IN THE MBFR NEGOTIATIONS AND THAT THE NEW ADMINISTRATION WOULD CONSULT ON SALT. ALTHOUGH NOT A DIRECT PARTICIPANT, DENMARK FOLLOWS THE MBFR TALKS WITH THE GREATEST ATTENTION AS ONE OF THE INSTRUMENTS AVAILABLE TO THE ALLIES TO DEMONSTRATE THAT THEY MEAN BUSINESS IN THE DISARMAMENT FIELD. REFERRING TO DENMARK'S RECENT SUGGESTIONS ON THE NEED FOR MORE STRIKING ARMS CONTROLS PROPOSALS FROM THE WEST, SVART STRESSED THE IMPORTANCE OF FINDING A WAY TO SHOW THE PUBLIC THAT NATO CAN OFFER PROPOSALS OF ITS OWN AND IT DOES NOT SIMPLY SAY NO TO THE MANY PROPOSALS THAT COME FROM THE OTHER SIDE. IN THIS REGARD, SVART COMMENTED ON THE COMMENTED ON THE IMPORTANCE OF CONTRIBUTIONS BY THE US TO ALLIED CONSULTATIONS IN THE ARMS CONTROL FIELD, PARTICULARLY SINCE A MORE ACTIVE POLICY WOULD REQUIRE INPUTS BEYOND THOSE THAT THE SMALLER ALLIES COULD MAKE. SVART LOOKED FORWARD TO A LIVELY EXCHANGE OF VIEWS AMONG THE ALLIES IN PREPARATIONS FOR BELGRADE AND EXPRESSED THE HOPE

THAT THE ALLIES WOULD ALSO CONTINUE ACTIVELY TO SEEK THE VIEWS
OF THE EUROPEAN NEUTRALS.

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13. HARDY (CANADA) WELCOMED THE VICE PRESIDENT'S
VISIT. NATO, SINCE ITS CREATION, HAS BEEN THE
BACKBONE OF CANADA'S FOREIGN AND DEFENSE POLICY.
CANADIAN SECURITY DEPENDED ON THE LEADERSHIP AND SENSE
OF COMMON DESTINY WHICH NORTH AMERICA AND
EUROPE CAN TOGETHER IMPART TO THE ALLIANCE.
NOTING THE NEED TO MAINTAIN PUBLIC CONFIDENCE
THROUGH AN OBJECTIVE AND DISPASSIONATE EVALUATION
OF THE INTERNATIONAL SITUATION, HARDY SAID THE
ALLIANCE MUST PRESENT A BALANCED PICTURE OF THE
SOVIET THREAT IN ORDER TO PURSUE ITS POLICIES OF
DETERRENCE, DEFENSE, DISARMAMENT, AND DETENTE.
LIKE SOME OTHER ALLIES, CANADA WAS DISAPPOINTED
WITH THE LIMITED PROGRESS IN ARMS CONTROL AND THE
FACT THAT INITIATIVES IN THIS FIELD HAD BEEN LEFT
TO THE USSR. ALTHOUGH WESTERN PUBLIC OPINION
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RECOGNIZED THE HOLLOWINESS OF SOVIET PROPOSALS, THE
IMPRESSION WAS GROWING THAT NATO WAS INCAPABLE
OF DEVELOPING AND PRESENTING CONSTRUCTIVE ARMS
CONTROL PROPOSALS OF ITS OWN. CANADA WAS REASSURED
BY THE EARLY VISIT OF THE VICE PRESIDENT TO NATO
AND WAS GRATIFIED BY THE ATTENTION THE NEW US

ADMINISTRATION PROPOSED TO GIVE TO ECONOMIC RECOVERY, ENERGY, AND THE NORTH-SOUTH DIALOGUE.

14. SCHUURMANS (BELGIUM) EXPRESSED THE GRATIFICATION OF HIS AUTHORITIES OF THE VICE PRESIDENT'S VISIT TO BRUSSELS. NOTING THE VICE PRESIDENT'S REFERENCE TO EARLY ATTENTION TO THE PROBLEMS OF SOUTHERN AFRICA, SCHUURMANS STRESSED THE NEED TO HELP DEVELOP A SOLUTION WITH THE AFRICANS RATHER THAN TO IMPOSE A SOLUTION FROM THE OUTSIDE. HE STRESSED THE IMPORTANCE OF AFRICA TO EUROPE AS A NEIGHBORING CONTINENT AND AS A SOURCE OF RAW MATERIALS.

15. HOLMER (UK CHARGE) EXPRESSED THE APPRECIATION OF HIS AUTHORITIES FOR THE VICE PRESIDENT'S STATEMENT WHICH ON MANY POINTS ACCORDED WITH THE THINKING OF THE UK ON ALLIANCE ISSUES. WITH REGARD TO CONSULTATIONS, HOLMER ASKED WHETHER THE NEW ADMINISTRATION ENVISAGED DISCUSSIONS WITH THE ALLIES AT NATO ON THE IMPLICATIONS OF NEW MILITARY TECHNOLOGY.

16. TINE (FRANCE) WELCOMED THE VICE PRESIDENT'S REMARKS AND COMMENTED ON THE IMPORTANCE IN THE ALLIANCE OF UNDERSTANDING THE POLICIES AND POSITIONS OF OTHER MEMBERS. THIS WAS PARTICULARLY TRUE WITH RESPECT TO POLICIES OF THE STRONGEST MEMBER OF THE ALLIANCE. COMMENTING ON THE NEW WAVE OF FERMENT AND DISSIDENCE IN EASTERN EUROPE, WHICH HAS REAPPEARED DESPITE EFFORTS OF EASTERN REGIMES TO STIFLE DISSENT, TINE SUGGESTED THAT
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THE PROBLEMS POSED BY RECENT DEVELOPMENTS IN EASTERN EUROPE SHOULD BE A CENTRAL SUBJECT OF ALLIED CONSULTATIONS. WHAT THE USSR MIGHT DO TO PUT DOWN DISSENT IN EASTERN EUROPE, HOW THE EAST WOULD APPROACH BELGRADE, THE POSITION OUR OWN GOVERNMENTS SHOULD TAKE IN REACTING TO EVENTS IN EASTERN EUROPE--THESE, TINE STRESSED, PROVIDED A SERIES OF ISSUES ON WHICH ALLIED CONSULTATIONS SHOULD FOCUS.

17. IN RESPONDING TO THE ALLIES STATEMENTS AND QUESTIONS, THE VICE PRESIDENT SAID HE FOUND THE EXCHANGE MOST USEFUL IN IDENTIFYING CONCERNS AND INTERESTS OF MEMBERS OF THE COUNCIL. HE SAID HE WOULD REPORT FULLY TO THE PRESIDENT ON THE VIEWS THAT HAD BEEN EXPRESSED. WITH RESPECT TO SALT, THE VICE PRESIDENT SAID THE NEW ADMINISTRATION WAS NOW STUDYING WHAT ITS FIRST EFFORTS SHOULD BE IN AN ATTEMPT TO REGAIN MOMENTUM IN STRATEGIC ARMS LIMITATIONS. THE VLADIVOSTOK AGREEMENT, HE NOTED, PLACED A LID ON THE NUMBER OF MISSILES AND WARHEADS. THERE

WAS GENERAL AGREEMENT THAT SUCH A LIMITATION WAS
USEFUL. HOWEVER, THE VLADIVOSTOK AGREEMENT HAD THE DISADVANTAGE
OF PERMITTING A CONTINUED STRATEGIC ARMS RACE BOTH
WITHIN AND OUTSIDE THE LIMITS IT ESTABLISHED. THE ADMINISTRATION
WAS NOW EXPLOREING THE QUESTION OF WHETHER IT WOULD BE BEST
TO SIGN SUCH AN AGREEMENT AND TO GO ON TO SEEK ADDITIONAL
LIMITATIONS OR WHETHER ANOTHER APPROACH MIGHT BE MORE PROMISING.
THE PROBLEM WAS COMPLICATED BY SENSITIVE ISSUES SUCH AS HOW
TO DEAL WITH BACKFIRE AND CRUISE MISSILES. THE PRESIDENT FELT VERY

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TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 1310
SECDEF WASHDC IMMEDIATE
ALL NATO CAPITALS IMMEDIATE 6726
AMEMBASSY MADRID IMMEDIATE
AMEMBASSY MOSCOW IMMEDIATE
USMISSION EC BRUSSELS IMMEDIATE
USNMR SHAPE IMMEDIATE
USLOSACLANT IMMEDIATE
USDOCOSOUTH IMMEDIATE
USEUCOM IMMEDIATE
AMEMBASSY TOKYO IMMEDIATE

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STRONGLY, PARTICULARLY IN LIGHT OF HIS BACKGROUND
AND KNOWLEDGE AS A NUCLEAR ENGINEER, ABOUT THE NEED TO PRESS
HARD FOR REDUCTIONS OF NUCLEAR ARMAMENTS AND ON THE NEED
TO STRENGTHEN BARRIERS TO THE SPREAD OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS
AND THE DISTRIBUTION OF MATERIALS THAT COULD BE USED FOR THE
PRODUCTION OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS. THE US REALIZED THAT THESE OBJECTIVES
MUST BE PURSUDE THROUGH THE CLOSEST CONSULTATIONS WITH OUR
ALLIES; AND HE COULD ASSURE THE COUNCIL, THE VICE
PRESIDENT SAID, THAT US MOVES IN THIS AREA WOULD NOT COME
AS A SURPRISE TO NATO MEMBERS.

18. ON THE US CONTRIBUTION TO NATO, THE VICE PRESIDENT SAID HE
UNDERSTOOD THAT THE US BUDGET FORESAW A REAL INCREASE IN SPENDING
FOR ALLIED DEFENSE. THE NEW ADMINISTRATION WOULD MAINTAIN
THESE SCHEDULED EXPENDITURES AND WOULD ALSO CONSIDER INCREASING
THE US CONTRIBUTION IN THE CONTEXT OF AN INCREASED EFFORT BY
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THE OTHE ALLIES. IN THIS REGARD, THE VICE PRESIDENT EMPHASIZED THE IMPORTANCE OF EFFORTS TO IMPROVE RATIONALIZATION, STANDARDIZATION, AND FORCE DEPLOYMENT IN ORDER TO STRENGTHEN ALLIED DEFENSES. ON THE QUESTION OF HOW THE US VIEWED THE SOVIET MILITARY BUILD-UP, THE VICE PRESIDENT SAID WE WERE OF COURSE CONCERNED BUT CERTAINLY NOT DESPAIRING. HE AGREED WITH AMBASSADOR PAULS THAT IT WOULD BE COUNTER-PRODUCTIVE TO EXAGGERATE SOVIET CAPABILITIES AND THAT AN EFFORT SHOULD BE MADE TO DRAW BALANCED AND RATIONAL CONCLUSIONS FOR NATO FROM OUR ASSESSMENT. WHILE NOT WISHING TO COMMENT AT THIS STAGE ON CONSULTATIONS REGARDING NEW WEAPONS TECHNOLOGY, THE VICE PRESIDENT ASSURED THE COUNCIL THAT THE ADMINISTRATION WOULD PROCEED IN THIS AS IN OTHER AREAS IN A MANNER THAT WOULD NOT RESULT IN SURPRISES FOR THE NATO ALLIES. THE VICE PRESIDENT AGREED ON THE NEED TO ASSESS CAREFULLY THE IMPLICATIONS OF RECENT STIRRINGS IN EASTERN EUROPE. HE STRESSED US SUPPORT FOR ACTIVE ALLIED PREPARATIONS FOR THE BELGRADE MEETINGS, AND RECALLED, IN THIS REGARD, THE EMPHASIS PLACED BY THE PRESIDENT IN HIS INAUGURATION SPEECH ON THE IMPORTANCE THE US ATTACHES TO HUMAN RIGHTS EVERYWHERE.

19. IN CONCLUSION, THE VICE PRESIDENT SAID HE WAS VERY GRATEFUL FOR THIS OPPORTUNITY TO MEET WITH THE COUNCIL, TO SPEAK ON THE APPROACH OF THE NEW ADMINISTRATION, AND TO HEAR THE VIEWS OF COUNCIL MEMBERS. LUNS THANKED THE VICE PRESIDENT WARMLY FOR HIS PRESENCE AND FOR HIS REMARKS AND SAID THE COUNCIL MEETING HAD BEEN MOST USEFUL.

20. DEPARTMENT REPEAT TO OTHER POSTS AND MILITARY ADDRESSEES AS DESIRED. STRAUSS-HUPE

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